Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
zbMATH Open document ID: 0944.91044
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00028-1
author: Marilda Sotomayor
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2000-05-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 1441584
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: stable matching
zbMATH Keywords: core
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0165-4896(99)00028-1
OpenAlex ID: W2156540589
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1441584