Individual monotonicity and the leximin solution
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Individual monotonicity and the leximin solution
zbMATH Open document ID: 0959.91015
author: Mark A. Chen
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2001-04-26T00:00:00Z
review text: The author introduces to the \(n\)-person bargaining problem two supplementary assumptions due to which he derives new characteristics of the problem. To generally used Pareto efficiency and symmetry of solutions he adds individual monotonicity and independence of individually irrational points. Individual monotonicity means increasing of components of the solution with respect to the number of players. The independence means that if two problems have the same individually rational parts then their solutions coincides. The leximin solution for a two-person game is the Pareto efficient point maximizing the minimum of players' utilities. The author proves that the solution of the two-person game is equal to the leximin solution if and only if all four assumptions are true. The notion of the leximin solution is extended to the \(n\)-person problem and the statement about identity of solution and leximin remains true.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
zbMATH DE Number: 1439925
zbMATH Keywords: axiomatic bargaining theory
zbMATH Keywords: individual monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: leximin solution
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s001990050017
OpenAlex ID: W1480543747
DOI: 10.1007/S001990050017
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1439925