Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
zbMATH Open document ID: 0971.91014
author: Dolors Berga
author: Shigehiro Serizawa
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2001-10-24T00:00:00Z
review text: In the context of a single public good, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that there are no strategy-proof nondictatorial social choice functions on unrestricted preference domains. On the other hand, Moulin showed that generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof on single-peaked domains. The authors extend these results in two directions. First, they introduce the concept of a `minimally-rich' preference domain. Minimally-rich domains are smaller than single-peaked domains and the authors' first main result (Theorem 1) states that a social choice function on a minimally-rich domain is strategy-proof if and only if it is a generalized median voter scheme. Turning to the question of maximality of domain, the authors introduce a `no-vetoer' axiom to avoid the trivial dictatorial case. Under this condition, the authors obtain the following result (Theorem 2): The unique maximal domain containing a minimally-rich domain for strategy-proofness is the domain of convex preferences. Relaxing the no-vetoer condition, the authors give an example of a non-convex preference domain with a non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice function with vetoers.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 1445568
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proof
zbMATH Keywords: convex preferences
zbMATH Keywords: generalized median voter schemes
zbMATH Keywords: minimally rich domains
reviewed by: Duncan J. Melville
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jeth.1999.2579
OpenAlex ID: W2056740697
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DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2579
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1445568