A foundationalist view of the AGM theory of belief change
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A foundationalist view of the AGM theory of belief change
zbMATH Open document ID: 0943.68148
DOI: 10.1016/S0004-3702(99)00092-2
author: Alexander Bochman
published in: Artificial Intelligence
publication date: 2000-06-04T00:00:00Z
review text: We describe an alternative interpretation of the AGM postulates for belief change in a foundational framework of epistemic states suggested by Bochman (1997). Though foundational contractions constitute a new kind of belief contractions, incompatible with AGM postulates, a broad class of preferential AGM contractions is shown to be revision-equivalent to foundational contractions and can actually be produced using a modification of the contraction operation on epistemic states. It is shown also that revisions of epistemic states determine a natural class of preferential AGM revisions, and that all the AGM postulates for revision can be satisfied by imposing reasonable restrictions on underlying epistemic states. As a result, the foundational theory of epistemic states is shown to provide a unification of the main approaches to belief change on a foundationalist basis.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68T15
zbMATH DE Number: 1454124
zbMATH Keywords: belief change
zbMATH Keywords: AGM theory
zbMATH Keywords: epistemic states
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1454124