Random assignments of bundles
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Random assignments of bundles
zbMATH Open document ID: 1433.91096
author: Shurojit Chatterji
author: Peng Liu
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2020-04-07T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2429
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 7187728
zbMATH Keywords: random assignments
zbMATH Keywords: bundles
zbMATH Keywords: decomposability
zbMATH Keywords: sd-efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: sd-strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: equal treatment of equals
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3000564590
cites work: Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
cites work: Approximate Random Allocation Mechanisms
cites work: A new solution to the random assignment problem.
cites work: Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
cites work: Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
cites work: Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
cites work: Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
cites work: Assignment problems with complementarities
cites work: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
cites work: Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
Wikidata QID: Q126357615
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.12.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7187728