False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
zbMATH Open document ID: 1436.91012
author: Richmond Harbaugh
author: Theodore To
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2020-04-07T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: bepp2005-05-harbaugh-to.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 7187730
zbMATH Keywords: disclosure
zbMATH Keywords: unraveling
zbMATH Keywords: countersignaling
zbMATH Keywords: persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: verifiable message
zbMATH Keywords: private receiver information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2101592850
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Wikidata QID: Q127859411
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.10.004
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7187730