Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
zbMATH Open document ID: 1436.91013
author: Cheng Li
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2020-04-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B15
zbMATH DE Number: 7188570
zbMATH Keywords: centralized policymaking
zbMATH Keywords: decentralized policymaking
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: informational lobbying
zbMATH Keywords: social welfare
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-019-01218-1
OpenAlex ID: W2767569567
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-019-01218-1
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7188570