Learning a population distribution
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Learning a population distribution
zbMATH Open document ID: 1402.91081
author: Seung Han Yoo
publication date: 2018-11-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
zbMATH DE Number: 6971143
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian games
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic games
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian learning
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jedc.2014.09.010
OpenAlex ID: W2156450414
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.09.010
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6971143