Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures
zbMATH Open document ID: 1402.91935
author: Jasmina Arifovic
author: Janet Hua Jiang
author: Yi-Ping Xu
publication date: 2018-11-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91G80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B52
zbMATH DE Number: 6970151
zbMATH Keywords: bank runs
zbMATH Keywords: experimental studies
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary algorithm
zbMATH Keywords: coordination games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jedc.2013.06.016
OpenAlex ID: W2043957692
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JEDC.2013.06.016
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6970151