Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1402.91044
author: Luis R. Izquierdo
author: Segismundo S. Izquierdo
author: Fernando Vega-Redondo
publication date: 2018-11-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 6970558
zbMATH Keywords: option to leave
zbMATH Keywords: conditional dissociation
zbMATH Keywords: prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: positive assortment
zbMATH Keywords: exit option
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jedc.2014.06.007
OpenAlex ID: W2166720633
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.06.007
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6970558