Information aggregation with runoff voting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information aggregation with runoff voting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1460.91083
author: Nikolas Tsakas
author: Dimitrios Xefteris
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-02-23T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 09-19.pdf
review text: This paper investigates the information aggregation properties of runoff rules in general informational environments with an arbitrary number of alternatives. A multiple runoff rule is defined, in which voting takes place in multiple rounds, and the alternative with the least number of votes is eliminated in each round, until a unique winner is obtained. Voters are divided into common value voters, also referred to as truth-seeking, and diverse instances of partisan voters. While common value voters wish to efficiently aggregate their pieces of possibly conflicting information to make a correct decision and may disagree on which alternative is the best match due to private information, partisan voters support certain candidates by their own private reasons. It is then shown that, under general assumptions regarding the information environment and partisans' preferences, multi-round runoff voting achieves asymptotically full-information equivalence. The same investigation approach is applied to the plurality rule and the two-round runoff system. It is established that when there are more than two alternatives, the plurality rule does not always admit an efficient equilibrium, while the two-round runoff system can aggregate information efficiently as long as there are at most four alternatives.
reviewed by: Annibal Parracho Sant'Anna
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 7314457
zbMATH Keywords: elections
zbMATH Keywords: runoff voting
zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation
zbMATH Keywords: partisan voters
zbMATH Keywords: sequential elimination
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet jury theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2972705635
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2020.105130
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7314457