Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
zbMATH Open document ID: 1460.91086
author: Siyang Xiong
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-02-23T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper discusses voting mechanisms in a two-outcomes environment taking a game-theoretical approach. It is shown that, in different setups, a large class of voting rules, called voting mechanisms, which includes the majority voting rule, are implementable in Nash equilibrium if and only if they are dictatorial. The impossibility result no longer holds if the standard Nash equilibrium is replaced with a refined equilibrium notion that eliminates weakly dominated strategies, e.g., dominant Nash equilibria and undominated Nash equilibria. It can be generalized to setups of incomplete information and other equilibrium notions, e.g., correlated equilibria). The impossibility result is also extended to a stochastic version of voting mechanisms.
reviewed by: Annibal Parracho Sant'Anna
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 7314459
zbMATH Keywords: referendum
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: dictator
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2020.105133
OpenAlex ID: W3094792461
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2020.105133
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7314459