The value of mediated communication
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The value of mediated communication
zbMATH Open document ID: 1458.91043
author: Andrés Salamanca
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-02-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 7314483
zbMATH Keywords: communication games
zbMATH Keywords: optimal mediation
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: virtual utility
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: concavification
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2021.105191
OpenAlex ID: W2732174589
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2021.105191
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7314483