Strategic interpretations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic interpretations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1458.91042
author: Kfir Eliaz
author: Ran Spiegler
author: Heidi C. Thysen
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-02-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 7314484
zbMATH Keywords: persuasion
zbMATH Keywords: bounded rationality
zbMATH Keywords: model misspecification
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2021.105192
OpenAlex ID: W4249805999
cites work: Language barriers
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2021.105192
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7314484