Bargaining with a residual claimant: an experimental study
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Bargaining with a residual claimant: an experimental study
zbMATH Open document ID: 1458.91100
author: Matthew Embrey
author: Kyle Hyndman
author: Arno Riedl
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2021-02-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-05
zbMATH DE Number: 7314618
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: ex-post risk
zbMATH Keywords: reference points
describes a project that uses: ORSEE
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3123383200
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2020.12.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7314618