Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
zbMATH Open document ID: 1458.91120
author: Yanyan Li
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2021-02-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B41
zbMATH DE Number: 7314620
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: risk-neutral agency
zbMATH Keywords: limited liability
zbMATH Keywords: first-order approach
zbMATH Keywords: pay-for-performance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2021.01.002
OpenAlex ID: W3123493709
cites work: Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
cites work: Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt
cites work: Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
cites work: On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
cites work: A general solution method for moral hazard problems
cites work: Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
cites work: From Pigou to Extended Liability: On the Optimal Taxation of Externalities Under Imperfect Financial Markets
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2021.01.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7314620