Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
zbMATH Open document ID: 1452.91162
author: Serafin Grundl
author: Yu Zhu
published in: Journal of Econometrics
publication date: 2019-07-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/148130
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 62P20
zbMATH DE Number: 7075156
zbMATH Keywords: first-price auction
zbMATH Keywords: unobserved heterogeneity
zbMATH Keywords: risk aversion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2279017592
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JECONOM.2019.02.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7075156