Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91255
author: Tomoya Tajika
author: Tomoya Kazumura
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2019-07-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7079211
zbMATH Keywords: uniform price auction
zbMATH Keywords: no monopoly
zbMATH Keywords: large market
zbMATH Keywords: \(\epsilon \)-Bayesian Nash equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-018-0641-y
OpenAlex ID: W2895116419
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-018-0641-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7079211