Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91089
author: Alice Peng-Ju Su
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2019-07-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 7079216
zbMATH Keywords: team incentive
zbMATH Keywords: relative performance evaluation
zbMATH Keywords: joint performance evaluation
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: collusion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-018-00656-y
OpenAlex ID: W2906957784
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-018-00656-Y
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7079216