Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
zbMATH Open document ID: 1417.91187
author: Lydia Mechtenberg
author: Jean-Robert Tyran
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2019-07-12T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1613.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 7079572
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: experiment
zbMATH Keywords: information acquisition
zbMATH Keywords: information aggregation
describes a project that uses: ORSEE
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3122886876
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cites work: Would rational voters acquire costly information?
cites work: Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
cites work: Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
cites work: Committee Design with Endogenous Information
cites work: Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
Wikidata QID: Q128559111
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.12.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7079572