Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players
zbMATH Open document ID: 1429.91050
author: Shun Kurokawa
author: Yi Tao
author: Xiu-Deng Zheng
published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation
publication date: 2019-11-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 7137303
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.amc.2018.12.043
OpenAlex ID: W2909864889
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cites work: Q3040961
Wikidata QID: Q128592129
DOI: 10.1016/J.AMC.2018.12.043
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7137303