Objects and modalities. A study in the semantics of modal logic
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Objects and modalities. A study in the semantics of modal logic
zbMATH Open document ID: 1383.03003
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-53119-9
author: Tero Tulenheimo
published in: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
publication date: 2017-08-02T00:00:00Z
review text: This work characterizes a formal semantic framework based on a distinction between possible worlds, local objects and individuals. A local object is an object that exists in a possible world or another and it is world-bound, that is, it cannot exist in more than one world. For its part, individuals are trans-world, that is, they do not exist in possible worlds. Rather, they are realized at possible worlds as local objects, although they do not have to be realized at every possible world. Individuals connect different local objects across possible worlds and, for this reason, they are also referred as world lines. At some point in the book, the author compares his approach to individuals with other views, in particular, those by S. Kripke, D. Lewis and K. Fine. Predicates are assumed by the author to be true or false of local objects only and never of individuals. That is, at a possible world \(w\), \(n\)-ary predicates are true or false only of the local objects of \(w\). However, complex formulas might be true or false of individuals. The ranges of first-order quantifiers at a possible world are not the set of local objects of that world but rather a (possibly empty) set of individuals. These ranges might vary from one possible world to another. Two sorts of world lines or individuals are distinguished, viz.: those that are physically individuated and those that are intentionally individuated. On the basis of this distinction, a further distinction is introduced between physical and intentional first-order quantifiers. The range of a physical quantifier at a given world consists of world lines that are realized in that world, while that of an intentional quantifier might not include world lines fulfilling such a condition. Behind this difference is the idea that intentional quantifiers might quantify over non-existent intentional individuals, while physical quantifiers cannot. They are the individuals in an agent's thought at the world at which an intentional quant…
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03-02
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03B45
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6755684
zbMATH Keywords: individuals
zbMATH Keywords: first-order modal logic
zbMATH Keywords: predication
zbMATH Keywords: possible world relational semantics
zbMATH Keywords: individuation
zbMATH Keywords: Hintikka, mental states
zbMATH Keywords: intentionality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53119-9
OpenAlex ID: W4253931416
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6755684