Evolution of cooperation through power law distributed conflicts
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolution of cooperation through power law distributed conflicts
zbMATH Open document ID: 1367.93053
DOI: 10.1155/2017/9271651
author: Pilwon Kim
published in: Complexity
publication date: 2017-08-03T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: At an individual level, cooperation can be seen as a behavior that uses personal resource to support others or the groups which one belongs to. In a conflict between two individuals, a selfish person gains an advantage over a cooperative opponent, while in a group-group conflict the group with more cooperators wins. In this work, we develop a population model with continual conflicts at various scales and show cooperation can be sustained even when interpersonal conflicts dominate, as long as the conflict size follows a power law. The power law assumption has been met in several observations from real-world conflicts. Specifically if the population is structured on a scale-free network, both the power law distribution of conflicts and the survival of cooperation can be naturally induced without assuming a homogeneous population or frequent relocation of members. On the scale-free network, even when most people become selfish from continual person-person conflicts, people on the hubs tend to remain unselfish and play a role as ``repositories'' of cooperation.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 93A30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D10
zbMATH DE Number: 6756005
zbMATH Keywords: cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: group-group conflict
zbMATH Keywords: population model
Wikidata QID: Q59142962
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/9271651
OpenAlex ID: W2572629614
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DBLP publication ID: journals/complexity/Kim17
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6756005