Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91089
author: Jingfeng Lu
author: Sérgio O. Parreiras
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-08-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6761492
zbMATH Keywords: all-pay auctions
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetries
zbMATH Keywords: contests
zbMATH Keywords: correlated signals
zbMATH Keywords: interdependent valuations
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.03.005
OpenAlex ID: W2598467885
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cites work: Q3999542
cites work: Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
cites work: Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
cites work: Q4340161
cites work: Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
cites work: Common-value contests with asymmetric information
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6761492