Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91050
author: Friederike Mengel
author: Javier Rivas
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-08-17T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: Common value elections with private information and informative priors.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6761498
zbMATH Keywords: voter turnout
zbMATH Keywords: common value elections
zbMATH Keywords: private information
zbMATH Keywords: swing voter's curse
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet jury theorem
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2604785256
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cites work: Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
cites work: Large Poisson games
cites work: Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.009
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6761498