Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91121
author: Bettina Klaus
author: Flip Klijn
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-08-17T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 16.07.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6761499
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: substitutability
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2402479472
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6761499