Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91122
author: Taro Kumano
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-08-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6761500
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: Nash implementation
zbMATH Keywords: indifferences
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.04.003
OpenAlex ID: W2606966434
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.003
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6761500