Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91057
author: Jean-François Laslier
author: Matías Núñez
author: Carlos Pimienta
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-08-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6761501
zbMATH Keywords: approval voting
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: partial honesty
zbMATH Keywords: consensual equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.04.002
OpenAlex ID: W2607393501
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6761501