Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91056
author: Semin Kim
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-08-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6761507
zbMATH Keywords: ordinal rule
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian mechanism design
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.04.012
OpenAlex ID: W2567912903
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.012
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6761507