A tug-of-war team contest
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A tug-of-war team contest
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91082
author: Samuel Häfner
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-08-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 6761508
zbMATH Keywords: team contests
zbMATH Keywords: multi-stage contests
zbMATH Keywords: tug-of-war
zbMATH Keywords: all-pay auction
zbMATH Keywords: absorbing Markov chain
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.04.013
OpenAlex ID: W3122558134
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.04.013
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6761508