Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
zbMATH Open document ID: 1393.91003
author: Simon Dato
author: Andreas Grunewald
author: Daniel Müller
author: Philipp Strack
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-08-17T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/112947
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A30
zbMATH DE Number: 6761528
zbMATH Keywords: noncooperative games
zbMATH Keywords: expectation-based loss aversion
zbMATH Keywords: reference-dependent preferences
zbMATH Keywords: mixed strategies
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2257248950
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6761528