Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1368.92146
author: Shun Kurokawa
author: Yasuo Ihara
published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology
publication date: 2017-08-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D30
zbMATH DE Number: 6758824
zbMATH Keywords: reciprocity
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
zbMATH Keywords: common goods
zbMATH Keywords: mistakes
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect information
zbMATH Keywords: early hominins
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jtbi.2016.12.002
OpenAlex ID: W2560822824
Wikidata QID: Q53638090
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JTBI.2016.12.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6758824