Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1290.91056
author: Susumu Cato
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2014-06-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6305075
zbMATH Keywords: Arrow's impossibility theorem
zbMATH Keywords: strong Pareto
zbMATH Keywords: ultrafilter
zbMATH Keywords: conditional decisiveness
zbMATH Keywords: serial dictatorship
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11238-013-9352-9
OpenAlex ID: W2109579158
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-013-9352-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305075