Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1290.91057
author: Marc Pauly
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2014-06-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6305076
zbMATH Keywords: social choice theory
zbMATH Keywords: referendum
zbMATH Keywords: voting rules
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11238-013-9358-3
OpenAlex ID: W2045860333
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-013-9358-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305076