A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
zbMATH Open document ID: 1296.91019
author: Katsuhiko Aiba
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2014-06-19T00:00:00Z
review text: A stochastic game on infinite horizon is considered where each player gets a noisy information about the others' moves. Under suitable technical hypotheses, which include in particular the conditions that (1) the initial condition will be `forgotten' in a precise sense, (2) the information about the others' moves is sufficiently informative, and (3) the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1, it is shown that every individually rational feasible discounted payoff is attainable, thereby establishing a version of the `folk theorem'.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
zbMATH DE Number: 6305582
zbMATH Keywords: folk theorem
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic game
zbMATH Keywords: almost-perfect monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: discounted payoff
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2014.03.007
OpenAlex ID: W1963975312
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.007
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305582