On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-\(k\)
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-\(k\)
zbMATH Open document ID: 1294.91022
author: Yves Breitmoser
author: Jonathan H. W. Tan
author: Daniel John Zizzo
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2014-06-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 6305586
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium refinement
zbMATH Keywords: logit equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: rationalizability
zbMATH Keywords: quantal response
zbMATH Keywords: level-\(k\)
zbMATH Keywords: inequity aversion
zbMATH Keywords: experiment
describes a project that uses: NEWUOA
describes a project that uses: Gambit
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2014.03.002
OpenAlex ID: W2238507798
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305586