Random dictatorship domains
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Random dictatorship domains
zbMATH Open document ID: 1296.91098
author: Shurojit Chatterji
author: Arunava Sen
author: Huaxia Zeng
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2014-06-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1400
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B10
zbMATH DE Number: 6305592
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: random social choice functions
zbMATH Keywords: random dictatorship
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2141503757
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.017
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305592