Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1296.91131
author: Steven R. Williams
author: Konstantinos E. Zachariadis
author: Mark Allen Satterthwaite
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2014-06-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 6305594
zbMATH Keywords: double auction
zbMATH Keywords: designed mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: correlated values
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2014.03.014
OpenAlex ID: W2133410115
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.014
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305594