Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information transmission and inefficient lobbying
zbMATH Open document ID: 1296.91226
author: Rafael Costa Lima
author: Humberto Moreira
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2014-06-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B99
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B60
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
zbMATH DE Number: 6305596
zbMATH Keywords: lobby
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: common agency
zbMATH Keywords: political economy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2014.02.010
OpenAlex ID: W2119790577
cites work: Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
cites work: Common Agency
cites work: Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
cites work: A model of expertise
cites work: Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
cites work: The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
cites work: The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.02.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305596