Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Truthful germs are contagious: a local-to-global characterization of truthfulness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1296.91097
author: Aaron Archer
author: Robert D. Kleinberg
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2014-06-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6305600
zbMATH Keywords: truthful mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: implementation theory
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: local-to-global characterization
zbMATH Keywords: multi-dimensional types
zbMATH Keywords: cyclic monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: weak monotonicity
zbMATH Keywords: vortex-freeness
zbMATH Keywords: truthful stitching
zbMATH Keywords: Rochet's theorem
zbMATH Keywords: Stokes's theorem
zbMATH Keywords: Saks-Yu theorem
zbMATH Keywords: first-order logic
zbMATH Keywords: orthogonal polynomials
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2014.01.004
OpenAlex ID: W2057857467
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.01.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305600