Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proof contract auctions and the role of ties
zbMATH Open document ID: 1296.91141
author: Mathijs M. de Weerdt
author: Paul Harrenstein
author: Vincent Conitzer
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2014-06-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6305603
zbMATH Keywords: contract auction
zbMATH Keywords: indifferences
zbMATH Keywords: social choice function
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: tie-breaking
zbMATH Keywords: weakly transferable utility
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2013.09.001
OpenAlex ID: W2058110299
cites work: The core of the matching game
cites work: Topics in mathematical economics and game theory. Essays in honor of Robert J. Aumann
cites work: Towards a Mechanism for Incentivating Privacy
cites work: Core-selecting package auctions
cites work: Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
cites work: Stable marriage and indifference
cites work: Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
cites work: Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2013.09.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305603