Pricing traffic in a spanning network
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Pricing traffic in a spanning network
zbMATH Open document ID: 1294.91037
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2014-06-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A43
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B20
zbMATH DE Number: 6305607
zbMATH Keywords: connection game
zbMATH Keywords: core stability
zbMATH Keywords: routing-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: minimal cost spanning tree or forest
author: Hervé Moulin
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2013.06.002
OpenAlex ID: W4230237005
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2013.06.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305607