Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
zbMATH Open document ID: 1296.91130
author: Paolo Penna
author: Carmine Ventre
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2014-06-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6305608
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: algorithmic mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: transferable utilities
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2012.09.002
OpenAlex ID: W1990326103
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2012.09.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6305608