On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
zbMATH Open document ID: 1310.90052
author: Jelle Duives
author: Birgit Heydenreich
author: Debasis Mishra
author: Rudolf Müller
author: Marc Uetz
published in: Journal of Scheduling
publication date: 2015-03-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B36
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68M20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6419710
zbMATH Keywords: auction
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: scheduling
zbMATH Keywords: economics
zbMATH Keywords: combinatorial optimization
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10951-014-0378-9
OpenAlex ID: W2133880097
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DOI: 10.1007/S10951-014-0378-9
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6419710