Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1461.91118
author: Edith Elkind
author: Umberto Grandi
author: Francesca Rossi
author: Arkadii Slinko
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2021-04-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q17
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 7338119
zbMATH Keywords: strategic voting
zbMATH Keywords: bounded rationality
zbMATH Keywords: computational complexity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2020.07.001
OpenAlex ID: W3040969926
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.07.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7338119