Superset-robust collective choice rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Superset-robust collective choice rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 1461.91088
author: Walter Bossert
author: Susumu Cato
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2021-04-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 7338159
zbMATH Keywords: collective choice rule
zbMATH Keywords: superset robustness
zbMATH Keywords: agreement
zbMATH Keywords: filter
zbMATH Keywords: infinite population
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2020.10.007
OpenAlex ID: W3105359897
Wikidata QID: Q115163017
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.10.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7338159