Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1503.91045
author: Takashi Kunimoto
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2021-04-26T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2073
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
zbMATH DE Number: 7338105
zbMATH Keywords: complete information
zbMATH Keywords: first-order belief
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: measurability
zbMATH Keywords: robust virtual implementation
zbMATH Keywords: rationalizable strategies
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2784223700
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.09.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7338105