Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1461.91119
author: Yasunori Okumura
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2021-04-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B03
zbMATH DE Number: 7339926
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: sincere voting
zbMATH Keywords: uncertainty
zbMATH Keywords: Choquet expected utility
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11238-020-09771-3
OpenAlex ID: W3006034708
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-020-09771-3
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7339926