The projective core of symmetric games with externalities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The projective core of symmetric games with externalities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1461.91015
author: Takaaki Abe
author: Yukihiko Funaki
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2021-04-27T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: No.E1809.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B18
zbMATH DE Number: 7340208
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
zbMATH Keywords: oligopoly
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3094031135
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-020-00745-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7340208