Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an evergreen clause
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an evergreen clause
zbMATH Open document ID: 1461.91136
author: P. Dutta
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2021-05-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 7347185
zbMATH Keywords: repeated bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: evergreen clause
zbMATH Keywords: compromise
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2020.105170
OpenAlex ID: W3107654051
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2020.105170
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7347185